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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from convictions of theft by deception, both 
second degree felonies. Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3(2)(f), provides 
this Court!s jurisdiction over this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
This Court reviews a trial court's performance of jury 
voir dire for abuse of discretion. State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 
201, 205 (Utah App. 1992) . "Whether a trial court abused its 
discretion in conducting voir dire depends on whether, 'considering 
the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate 
opportunity to acquire the information necessary to evaluate 
[prospective jurors.]1" Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the 
Court) . 
The issue was preserved by trial counsels1 pre-submitted 
voir dire questions, and objection to the trial court's failures to 
ask requested questions. (R.709,710,718, 719, 725) . 
1. Did the trial court give the jury an erroneous 
instruction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The Court reviews this as a question of law, for 
correctness. Ontiveros. supra. The court reviews "jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." id. (citation omitted). 
This issue was preserved by trial counsels' objections. 
(R.1164-1171). 
3. Did the trial court err in blocking the presentation of 
defense evidence and in denying jury instructions requested by the 
defense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The jury instruction aspect of this issue is reviewed for 
correction of error. Ontiveros, supra. As to the evidence aspect 
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of this issue, the record must show a clear abuse of discretion„ 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
The issue was preserved by trial counsels1 objections to 
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, and by trial 
counsels1 efforts to present the evidence. (R.1151-1158; 1164-
1171) . 
4. Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to request 
proper defense instructions, and/or did the trial court commit 
plain error in failing to give these instructions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Because the trial court was not presented the issue, this 
Court must determine whether trial counsel was ineffective as a 
matter of law. Salt Lake City v. Grotespas, 874 P.2d 136,138 (Utah 
App. 1994). Review of trial counsels1 performance is to be 
"'highly deferential111 and is to avoid "* distorting effects of 
hindsight.1" Id. (citations omitted). 
In assessing ineffective assistance, this Court should 
determine whether the errors below were both obvious and harmful. 
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 
(1989) . This Court has the discretion to dispense with the 
obviousness requirement where the error was harmful in retrospect, 
but may not have been readily apparent to the trial court and 
counsel. Id., 773 P.2d at 35 and n.7. See also State v. Verde, 
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770 P. 2d 116,122 (Utah 1989) (applying plain error standard to 
failure to given jury instructions sua sponte) . The issue was not 
raised below. 
5. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the 
statutes governing this case, in concluding that the facts alleged 
here could constitute theft by deception? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error.11 State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781,796 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsels' 
motions to quash the bindover orders and motions to dismiss the 
case. (R.19-60; 183-233; 560; 1052-1053). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provision may be determinative in this 
appeal: Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah charged Tonya Vigil (hereinafter 
"defendant") with two counts of theft by deception. Kenneth Brown 
represented defendant in trial. (R.13; 175). The case was bound 
over to district court, and defendant entered a plea of not guilty 
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to all charges. (R.17; 181). Defendant moved to quash the 
bindover orders (R.19-69; 183-233; 560), and the trial court denied 
the motions. (R.82; 261; 582). 
Defendant moved to sever the two counts in the two district 
court cases. The State opposed this motion (R.252-260), and moved 
to join both cases against defendant in a trial on similar cases 
filed against defendant's husband, Thomas M. Vigil. (R.75-81; 245-
251) . The trial court joined all counts and cases against both 
these defendants together for one trial. (R.261, 585-586). 
The jury convicted defendant as charged. (R.393-394; 397). 
The trial judge sentenced defendant to serve two concurrent 
terms one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison, suspended the 
sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to a six-month 
jail term. 
From this conviction, defendant filed a timely appeal. (R.531 
and 476). 
After the notice of appeal was filed, a conflict of interest 
caused Mr. Brown to withdraw as counsel, and Mary C. Corporon now 
represents Tonya Vigil on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DEFENSE CASE 
Thomas and Tonya Vigil were married and living with five 
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children in their home as of the summer of 1992. Tonya went to her 
physician for a tubal ligation and discovered she was pregnant. 
Because the Vigils were financially destitute, they decided to give 
up the expected child for adoption. The Vigils made arrangements 
to give up the unborn baby for adoption to three separate families, 
the Elizondos, the Bushmans, and the Hallidays. During the course 
of the transactions, all the prospective adoptive parents gave the 
Vigils money for expenses. The Vigils did not give up their child 
for adoption to the Elizondo couple because the Vigils had 
disagreements and difficulties with the attorney representing the 
Elizondos. The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to 
the Bushman couple because of difficulties with Mr. Bushman, mainly 
because Mr. Bushman told them that he had decided not to adopt the 
child himself. The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption 
to the Hallidays because, after the child was born, they could not 
part with her. The Vigils kept their baby. They did not inform 
any of the couples when she was born, and did not inform any of the 
couples that they were receiving expense money from other couples. 
(R.1062-1151). 
STATE CASE 
Bushmans: 
Rex Bushman was an adoption attorney whom Tonya Vigil called 
to arrange the adoption. When the Vigils met with him in person on 
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February 28, 1993, he drafted and they signed a document indicating 
that he would find a family to adopt their baby. He asked the 
Vigils if his own family might adopt their child, and they agreed. 
He offered to pay for medical expenses and they agreed. He drafted 
and they signed an agreement for the payment of maternity expenses 
on March 5, 1995. The agreement indicated that they would return 
the expense money in the event that the adoption did not go 
through. He also drafted and they signed a form purporting to 
waive any conflict of interest stemming from his dual roles as 
their attorney and an adoptive parent. (R.754-761). 
About March 3, 1993, Mr. Vigil called Mr. Bushman twice, 
indicating the Vigils' need for living expenses of approximately 
$1,500. Mr. Bushman had agreed to pay $500 in living expenses, and 
then agreed in writing to pay them $1,000 after their consent to 
the adoption was final. Mr. Bushman wrote a check for $390 for 
their rent, and a check to Mrs. Vigil for $110. (R.761-766). 
Mr. Bushman maintained contact with the Vigils, but had 
decided not to adopt the Vigil baby. Sometime after March 19, 
1993, Mrs. Vigil told him the adoption was still on. He called 
again later and found that the telephone had been disconnected, and 
he called the police. The adoption never went through, and the 
Vigils never repaid Mr. Bushman the $500. (R.766-769). 
Mr. Bushman testified that he would not have paid the Vigils 
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$500 if he had not intended to obtain the baby. When asked if he 
considered the money a gift or charitable donation, he indicated 
that he found that idea "preposterous." He also testified that he 
would not have given the Vigils the $500 if he had known that other 
people were paying the Vigils in anticipation of adopting the baby. 
(R.769). 
The Elizandos: 
The Elizondos were attempting to adopt a child through an 
attorney named John Giffen. Their legal contacts informed them 
that the Vigils had an interest in having them adopt their child, 
so Mr. Elizondo called Mrs. Vigil on the telephone in October of 
1992, when she was living with her mother. After further telephone 
contact with Mrs. Vigil, Mr. Elizondo arranged to pay $500 a month 
for her pregnancy expenses through Mr. Giffen1s office. He paid 
$1,200 to get Mrs. Vigil into an apartment in November of 1992, and 
paid a total of $4,300. John Giffen testified the Vigils received 
about $5,300. The Elizondos flew to Salt Lake City from their home 
in California to visit the Vigils in February. Mrs. Vigil told 
them the baby was due in March, and forms she filled out for Mr. 
Giffen specified March 27, 1993 as the due date. (R. 879-895; 927; 
975-976) . 
Later in February, Thomas Vigil called Mr. Elizondo and asked 
him to change attorneys because Mr. Vigil was not happy with John 
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Gif fen. The Vigils did not like the way the money was being 
managed, and wanted it to come directly to Mr. Vigil. John Gif fen 
confirmed that Mr. Vigil had had disagreements with him because Mr. 
Vigil wanted more money and wanted the money sent to him. There 
was also a problem because Mr. Giffen's assistant did not obtain 
medication necessary to treat Mrs. Vigil. (R.889; 905-907/ 914; 
918; 954-955; 958; 1010). 
Mr. Elizondo maintained contact with the Vigils in March of 
1993, until their telephone was disconnected. He later learned 
through Mr. Giffen's assistant that the Vigils had had the baby on 
March 18, 1993, and had decided to keep her. (R.895-897, 908). 
Mr. Elizondo testified that he knew that there was no 
guarantee that the adoption would go through, that he did not 
consider the money he paid to be a charitable contribution, that he 
would not have paid them had he known that others were paying them 
at the same time, and that he never got any money back from the 
Vigils. (R.897-898; 913). 
He had a civil lawsuit pending against the Vigils, which was 
filed by Paul Halliday, as of the date of trial. (R.921). 
The Hallidays: 
Paul and Vicky Halliday were working through an attorney, 
Marilyn Fineshriber, to adopt a child. Mrs. Vigil had originally 
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contacted their attorney about the prospective adoption on March 3 
or 4, and the Vigils met with the attorney on March 7 or 8, 1993. 
Mrs. Vigil said the prospective due date for the birth of the child 
was August 28, 1993. Mr. Halliday made arrangements to pay $900 in 
expenses to the Vigils on March 12, 1993, after Mrs. Vigil told the 
attorney on March 7, 1993, that the Vigils were about to be 
evicted, and another $600 on March 25 or 26, 1993, in response to 
Mr. Vigil's call to the attorney indicating that the Vigils' 
telephone had been disconnected and that they needed money to pay 
their utilities. The receipts for the checks to the Vigils from 
the law firm state that the payments were charitable donations. 
Mrs. Vigil told the attorney on March 23, 1993, that the Vigils 
were planning to go through with the adoption. The Hallidays did 
not adopt the Vigil baby. (R.803-810; 821-836; 860; 868). 
Mr. Halliday testified that he did not consider the $1,500 a 
gift to the Vigils, that he was not repaid by the Vigils, and that 
he would not have paid the money had he known that they would not 
receive the baby or that other people were also trying to adopt the 
baby. (R.810-811). 
Mr. Halliday admitted on cross-examination that his attorney 
had informed him that the $1,500 was a charitable contribution, and 
that the money did not guarantee the adoption would go through (R. 
815) . He testified that he had a civil suit pending against the 
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Vigils. (R.818). 
Mr. Vigil called the Hallidays' attorney on April 6, 1993, and 
told her that they had not intended to defraud anyone, but had 
decided to keep the baby, and would pay back the money. He also 
told her that a California couple had just offered to pay their 
expenses, and that he had made no commitment to give the child up 
for adoption. (R. 867). 
LEGAL ADVICE TO THE VIGILS 
Marilyn Fineshriber, the Hallidays1 attorney, testified that 
she told the Vigils the money from the Hallidays was a charitable 
contribution, and legally could not bind their consent to the 
adoption. (R.848-849; 864). 
John Giffen, the attorney representing the Elizondos and the 
Vigils, informed all parties that the money from the Elizondos did 
not buy the consent to the adoption, but was considered a 
charitable contribution. He gave the Vigils a form detailing 
adoption-related crimes under California law, which indicated that 
it is a crime to receive pregnancy expenses with the intent to 
withhold consent to the adoption. He testified that in going over 
the form he drafted entitled "Pitfalls of Adoption" regarding 
various provisions of California law, he told the Vigils that it 
was illegal to accept money from other couples, and explained that 
Utah law is similar to California's, and counseled them about the 
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vulnerable emotional state of the prospective adoptive parents. 
(R.930-932; 992) . 
Mrs. Vigil testified that John Giffen did not go over the 
forms with them, or advise them about any legal issues surrounding 
adoption, but sent his non-law-trained assistant to bring the 
Vigils the forms. (R.1121-1122). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A new trial is required because the voir dire in the instant 
case did not provide trial counsel with adequate information with 
which to assess the prospective jurors. The trial court!s failure 
to ask the jurors about their fairness and impartiality, about 
their independence in deliberations, and about the impact of their 
exposure to media reports concerning attempted adoptions, 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction which 
purported to carve out a theft by deception exception from the 
statute which mandates that all monies given to birth parents by 
prospective adoptive parents be charitable donations. The 
instruction was inconsistent with Utah statutes and cases, and was 
prejudicial to defendant. 
The trial court erred in blocking defendant's presentation of 
her defense evidence pertinent to her motivation in seeking out 
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successive prospective adoptive couples. The court compounded the 
error by refusing her requested defense instructions which 
elucidated her motivation for seeking out multiple prospective 
adoptive couples. 
Trial counsel and the trial court prejudiced defendants 
defense by failing to give two jury instructions established by 
statute, which would have provided defenses to her actions. 
The trial court erred in ruling that charitable contributions 
by prospective adoptive parents can be the object of theft by 
deception charges. This Court should resolve this issue by 
ordering the case dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE. 
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts 
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire. E.g. State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6 (Utah 1988) (citing Article 
I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution, and the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution), reversed 
on other grounds. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) . The 
Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power to reiterate 
to the trial courts that it is their responsibility to insure that 
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voir dire proceedings not only provide adequate information for the 
informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate bias 
and prejudice from criminal trials. State v. James, 819 P. 2d 781, 
797-798 (Utah 1991). In James, the Court directed trial courts to 
go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire required by federal 
constitutional standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror 
biases. Id. See also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 
1988); State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 1053-1061 (Utah 1984). 
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 [T] he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel 
to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and 
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would 
not have supported a challenge for cause.' All that is necessary 
for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow 
'defense counsel to exercise peremptory challenges more 
intelligently. « " State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 
1988)(citation omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 (1) (f) codifies the right to an 
impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, 18(e)(14), 
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings adequate to 
reveal juror bias. The rule provides that a juror should be 
removed for cause if voir dire indicates "that a state of mind 
exists on the part of the juror with reference to the "cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
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without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging[. ] " 
Trial courts carry a heavy responsibility in conducting voir 
dire in criminal cases. Mu!Min v. Virginia, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 501-
510 (1991); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991). 
B. THE VOIR DIRE IN THIS CASE WAS 
INADEQUATE. 
After the initial round of voir dire, the trial court held a 
hearing outside the jury's presence, wherein defense counsel asked 
the trial court to ask the following pre-submitted questions: 
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the 
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt 
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found 
that a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was 
guilty, would you change your verdict only because you 
were in the minority? 
28. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair 
and impartial state of mind that you would not be 
satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state 
judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on 
trial here? In other words, would you want someone with 
your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you 
were the defendant? 
(R.709). The trial court declined to ask questions 27 and 28, 
because the court was of the opinion that he had already conducted 
sufficient voir dire. (R.710). 
Evaluating the "totality of the questioning, 5' State v. 
Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992), this Court can see that the trial court abused its 
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discretion in failing to ask these two questions. The voir dire 
never addressed whether the prospective jurors felt they were 
generally fair and impartial, or whether they would maintain their 
independence in the deliberation process, or succumb to pressure 
from a majority. 
Defense counsel also requested pre-submitted question 10, 
which stated: 
10. Have any of you see [n] any recent television 
programs, or received other information, depicting 
attempted adoptions? What did you hear? 
Counsel for co-defendant Mr. Vigil informed the court that two 
television programs concerning attempted or failed adoptions had 
aired approximately one month and one week prior to the trial. 
(R.710). He asked the court to inquire about exposure to the 
programs, and the court agreed to do so. (R.709; 710). 
Prospective juror Pepper had seen a program during the week prior 
to trial. (R.715). The trial court asked him no follow up 
questions, but he had already been stricken for cause. 
Prospective juror Jerman had seen a show that winter. 
(R.716). When the court asked Jerman if that exposure to that 
information would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Mr. 
Jerman said that it would not. (R.716). Mr. Jerman had already 
been stricken for cause. 
Prospective juror Wylie had seen a program somewhere within 
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six months prior to trial, and had read a magazine article about 
the subject. (R.715). The colloquy was as follows: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. Wylie, 
As a result of the documentary or the article in the 
magazine, and considering the nature of today's case, 
would any of that information interfere with your 
responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
MS. WYLIE: No, not really. 
THE COURT: You are certain you could remain fair and 
impartial to both sides of this case? 
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes. 
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word "think." Do 
you have a hesitation? 
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that 
detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially. 
(R.715-716). 
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show called 
"Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption and then 
their minds were changed and the natural parents got the child 
back." (R.717). She answered "No," when the court asked, "Would 
any of that information interfere with your abilities to be fair 
and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?" (R.717). 
At an unrecorded bench conference prior to the parties' 
passing of the jurors for cause, defense counsel objected to the 
trial court's refusal to further interview jurors Wylie and Reese 
in chambers regarding what television programs they had seen and 
how they felt about them. (R.718, 725). Both Reese and Wylie 
served on the Vigils' jury. (R.719). (Trial counsel was under no 
obligation to remove them in order to preserve this issue. It was 
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sufficient to request additional voir dire, and to obtain a ruling. 
State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 n.l (Utah App. 1992). The 
trial court opined that the totality of the questions to all 
prospective jurors was adequate. (R.726). 
Trial counsel was correct in requesting further voir dire of 
the jurors. In State v. Boyatt. 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (1993), a case wherein the potential jurors 
had been victims of crimes similar to those at issue, this Court 
stated, ,![T]he trial court must adequately probe a juror's 
potential bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest 
a potential bias. The trial court does not abuse its discretion 
when, after sufficient questioning, the suggestion of bias has been 
dispelled." Id. at 552. This holding applies here, wherein two 
of the prospective jurors had heard media reports which may have 
biased them, and state they "think" they could be unbiased. 
This Court has recognized the need for specific voir dire of 
prospective jurors in civil cases who have been exposed to similar 
media reports. In Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1989); 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96 (Utah App. 1993) ; and Evans v. 
Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1991), this Court has explained that, once preliminary questioning 
establishes jurors have been exposed to "tort reform propaganda," 
or media focusing on insurance reforms, prejudice is established, 
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and the parties are entitled to more specific questioning to 
determine if jurors bear latent or deep-rooted biases as a result. 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-459; Barrett, 868 P.2d at 99-101; Evans, 824 
P. 2d at 464-46. Given the interests at stake in a criminal case, 
trial courts should provide at least as much voir dire as they are 
required to provide in the civil arena. See Hafen at 45 8 n.2 
(intimating that the scope of voir dire in criminal cases might 
need to exceed the scope of civil trial voir dire in order to 
safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants). 
When the trial court found that two of the prospective jurors 
had been exposed to programs focusing on similar cases, which the 
jurors remembered, under Hafen Barrett, and Evans, prejudice was 
established and the trial court should have asked more specific 
questions to determine if the prospective jurors bore latent or 
deep-rooted biases regarding the issues in the case. See id. 
The trial court's perfunctory questions to prospective jurors 
Reese and Wylie about whether, in light of the media exposure, they 
felt that they could be fair and impartial, were inadequate. Juror 
Wylie never gave an unequivocal response to the trial court's 
question. Even if she had, the court should have asked more 
meaningful questions so that he and counsel could have assessed the 
impact of the media on Ms. Wylie and Ms. Reese. 
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not simply 
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accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a case 
fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about the 
juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial court to 
ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears latent biases 
which would impair the juror's performance. See State v. Woolley, 
810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.) , cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar 
to that at issue, an inference of bias arises, which is not 
rebutted by a juror's claim that he can be fair and impartial). 
See also State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981). 
As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty, 824 P. 2d 460 (Utah App, 
1991), "[I]t is not enough for a trial judge to ask questions 
merely to discover a potential juror's overt biases. The judge 
must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear responses to 
questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious attitudes. 
Without such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling a fair and 
impartial jury is diminished." JEd. at 462. 
Reviewing the totality of the questioning, this Court can see 
that trial counsel was not afforded adequate information to assess 
the prospective jurors. Because the trial court thus abused his 
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discretion in conducting the voir dire, a new trial is in order. 
See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992) . 
In a related decision on appeal, State of Utah v. Thomas N. 
Vigil, Case No. 940614-CA in the above Court, filed July 5, 1996, 
this Court analyses the same jury voir dire and finds that the 
colloquy between the trial court and Wylie and Reese to be 
adequate. This Court finds that " . . . the trial court persevered 
in its line of questioning to ensure that the two would be fair and 
impartial." With all due respect, defendant here asserts that the 
court did not persevere in questioning enough with Ms. Wylie to 
determine if she should be stricken for cause. As noted in the 
State v. Vigil, supra, Ms. Wylie, in response to a question about 
whether media information would interfere with her responsibility 
to be fair and impartial, responded "No, not really." She clearly 
qualified her answer. When pressed again about her ability to be 
impartial, she again qualified her answer by saying "I think, yes." 
When pressed yet another third time about her qualified answers, 
she said "I think I can listen impartially." (emphasis added) Ms. 
Wylie never once gave an unequivocal answer to an inquiry about 
media information and its impact on her fairness and impartiality. 
Trial counsel properly preserved this issue by objecting to the 
trial judge's refusal to question Wylie further. This left trial 
counsel unable to ask that Ms. Wylie be stricken for cause because 
21 
her answers were equivocal, and left them uncertain how to exercise 
their peremptory challenges, because her answers were unclear. The 
court refused to clarify this. The trial court clearly did abuse 
its discretion in refusing to question Ms. Wylie further. 
POINT 2. THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT JURIES 
CORRECTLY. 
The law governing jury instructions is that "beyond the 
substantive scope, correctness and clarity of the jury 
instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. However, said instructions 
must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material rules of law." 
State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 843 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
DEFENDANT'S JURY. 
Trial counsel objected to the portion emphasized below in the 
trial court's jury instruction 28, (R.1170), which provides: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 8 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation 
may pay maternity expenses, related medical or hospital, 
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and 
during confinement. However, that act of paying is by 
law considered an act of charity and may not be made for 
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the purpose of inducing the mother, parent or legal 
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or 
her child is a personal and private act of that person 
and may not be bought or bartered for under the law. A 
natural parent at any time may choose not to consent to 
an adoption. By so choosing, that person does not 
subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility 
unless you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every element of the offense of Theft by 
Deception, as charged in the Information have been 
established. (Emphasis added). 
The problem with the emphasized portion of instruction 28 is 
that it carves out a theft by deception exception from the statute 
which mandates that all monies given by prospective adoptive 
parents to birth mothers are charitable contributions, which does 
not exist in Utah law. Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 states: 
Any person, while having custody, care, control, or 
possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, or 
attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of 
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
However, this section does not prohibit any person, 
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related 
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of the 
mother preceding and during confinement as an act of 
charity, so long as payment is not made for the purpose 
of inducing the mother, parent, or legal guardian to 
place the child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or 
cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
There can be no theft by deception in the context of an 
adoption, because any money given to the birth mother is a 
charitable contribution, as a matter of law, and cannot be 
consideration for a promised consent to the adoption. Utah Code 
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Ann. §76-7-203. 
Reliance is an essential element of theft by deception. State 
v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982). Even if the alleged victims 
were deceived, there was no theft by deception unless they relied 
on the Vigils1 statements in parting with their money. Id. 
Because the birth parents1 consent cannot be bought under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203 under any circumstances, the prospective adoptive 
parents legally could not rely on the Vigils to consent to the 
adoption. 
Birth parents cannot deceive, because the object of their 
representations, the baby, cannot be sold, and thus has no 
pecuniary significance. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405(2) ("Theft by 
deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary signif icance [. ] lf) . 
Any birth parent aware of Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 would have 
a defense to a charge of theft by deception under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-402(3), which provides, "It is a defense under this part that 
the actor: (a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property 
or service involved; or (b) Acted in the honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did[.]" 
Under the plain language of Utah law, the conduct of a birth 
mother here cannot constitute theft by deception. In the event 
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that the legislature wishes to make conduct similar to that alleged 
here a crime, it may do so by adopting a statute which makes it a 
crime to accept such charitable contributions if there is no 
present intent to complete the adoption. In grafting a theft by 
deception exception into the charitable donation statute, the trial 
court invaded the province of the legislature, and violated the 
doctrine of separation of powers. See generally Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, section 46.03 (citations omitted); 
Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (separation of powers 
provision). The trial court has further chilled all good faith 
efforts to care for expectant birth mothers and their good faith 
efforts to place babies for adoption. 
The last sentence of Jury Instruction 28 misstates the law 
governing theft by deception, and the court erred in giving it to 
the jury. The instruction is the crux of the State's case, and the 
jury's receipt of it was highly prejudicial to defendant. 
POINT 3. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
PRESENT HER DEFENSE IN A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST ALLOW THE 
PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE. 
Every criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to 
present a complete defense to criminal charges against her. See 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985)("Whether rooted directly in 
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the 
Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.1 ... We break no new 
ground in observing that an essential component of procedural 
fairness is an opportunity to be heard.") (citations omitted) . The 
Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential 
aspect of due process guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to submit evidence." 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). "[T]he 
defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense 
is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our State 
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 [. ] " State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 
(Utah 1981) . Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution 
guarantees numerous rights to an accused. It states: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. (Emphasis added). 
B. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON DEFENSE THEORIES. 
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In instructing the jury, trial courts are governed by the 
requirement that "the defendant has a right to have his or her 
theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
comprehensible manner." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P. 2d 201, 205 
(Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted) . 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE. 
Trial counsel for Mr. Vigil called Roland Oliver to testify 
about services offered by adoption agencies. Upon the state's 
objection to the relevance of his testimony, both defense counsel 
argued that the evidence was relevant because, had the Vigils gone 
through adoption agencies, rather than through attorneys Bushman 
and Giffen, who provided inadequate services, the Vigils would not 
have proceeded as they did, in continuing to seek out prospective 
adoptive couples, and accepting expense monies from three different 
couples. The trial court sustained the relevance objection, and 
also excluded the evidence under Rule 403, finding that its 
admissipn might confuse and mislead the jury. (R.1151-1158) . 
In this ruling, the trial court forbade both defendants from 
presenting their defense. The constitutional provisions prevail, 
regardless of the Rules of Evidence. The United States 
Constitution, Article VI (supremacy clause); Constitution of Utah, 
Article I, Section 26 (provisions of Utah Constitution are 
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mandatory and prohibitory, unless expressly declared otherwise) . 
The trial court's ruling was also erroneous under the Rules of 
Evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402, provides for the admission of 
11
 [a] 11 relevant evidence . . . except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable 
in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is defined by Utah 
Rule of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." [emphasis added] 
Defendants' evidence regarding how adoptions should be 
conducted, in contrast to the performance of attorneys Bushman and 
Giffen, goes directly to the absence of the Vigils' intent to 
deceive anyone. By explaining proper adoption procedures through 
Mr. Oliver, defendant sought to demonstrate that the Vigils' 
behavior was caused by the inadequate performance of attorneys 
Bushman and Giffen, rather than motivated by any intent to deceive. 
The trial court's exclusion order was also based on Utah Rule 
of Evidence 403, which provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
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waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Utah law interpreting this rule demonstrates the error of the trial 
court's reasoning. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, courts are to 
presume that relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence 
has "an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or 
mislead the jury." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 
1993) . In the event that the evidence fell within such a class, 
the proponent of the evidence would then have the burden to show 
the unusual probative value of the evidence. Id. 
The testimony of Mr. Oliver defendants sought to introduce 
would not have an unusual propensity to "unfairly prejudice, 
inflame or mislead the jury," and its admission should be presumed. 
Assuming that the burden were on defendant to demonstrate the 
unusual probative value of the evidence, the burden is met. The 
State's proof of deception hinged on the fact that there were 
multiple prospective couples involved. The prosecutor told the 
jury that, had there been only one couple who tried to adopt the 
Vigil's baby, the State would not have prosecuted the Vigils. 
(R.1175; 1308) . The theory of the defense was that it was the 
inadequate performance of attorneys Giffen and Bush, rather than an 
intent to deceive, that motivated that Vigils to become involved 
with multiple prospective adopting couples. (R.1297-1301). 
Evidence was presented regarding the inadequate services 
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provided by Giffen and Bushman. However, the vast majority of 
this evidence required legal training to appreciate. Mr. Giffin 
vacillated in his testimony regarding whether he represented the 
Vigils or the adoptive couple. (R.929; 941; Defendant's Exhibit 
9). He was clearly in a conflict of interest. Mr. Bushman was 
initially contacted to find an adoptive family, but he negotiating 
to adopt the Vigil baby himself, and then received documents 
authorizing him to find another couple to adopt the baby, and in 
fact negotiated with another couple to adopt the Vigil baby. 
(R.756-762; 772-783; 792). Both attorneys had the Vigils sign 
vague forms purporting to waive conflicts of interest. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 10; State's Exhibit 3). Mr. Bushman provided 
support money for the Vigils out of his attorney trust account, and 
drafted an agreement whereby the Vigils would have to return the 
funds if they did not consent to the adoption, in clear violation 
of the law. (R.779-780). Mr. Bushman, who advertised himself as 
an adoption attorney, indicated that the idea that the money to the 
birth parents was a charitable contribution was "preposterous" thus 
showing an utter lack of knowledge of the law. (R.769-770). Mr. 
Giffen acknowledged having had difficulties with the Vigils, 
stemming from the way in which he was dispensing the funds, and 
because his assistant failed to obtain timely medical care for Mrs. 
Vigil. (R.938-939; 954). 
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Had the jurors been allowed to hear about proper adoption 
procedures from Roland Oliver, this would have clarified the 
deficiencies in the attorneys' performances, which the jurors may 
not have fully appreciated. The evidence would have supported the 
Vigils' defense that their motivation in seeking out successive 
couples was a lack of satisfaction with the attorneys, rather than 
a desire to deceive. 
The trial court's concerns that the evidence might confuse or 
mislead the jury underestimate the intelligence of juries and the 
importance of giving the jury the information relevant to deciding 
the facts. State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1994), 
demonstrates the error in the trial court's analysis. Teuscher was 
charged with homicide for the death of a child which occurred while 
the child was in Teuscher's day care facility. At trial, her 
attorney sought to exclude evidence of other uncharged instances of 
child abuse by Teucher. This Court held that under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), proof of the other crimes was entirely 
appropriate, inasmuch as the homicide charge to be determined by 
the jury required the jury's assessment of intent and absence of 
mistake. 
In Teuscher, this Court held that the evidence was also 
admissible under Rule 403. While evidence of uncharged crimes is 
normally considered to be presumptively prejudicial, rstate v. 
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Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)], this Court found that the 
probative value of the testimony outweighed the danger of 
prejudice. Teuscher at 928. 
The evidence at issue in Teuscher had a far greater danger of 
misleading or confusing the jury than did Mr. Oliver's testimony 
here. Unlike the prosecution in Teuscher, the defendant had 
constitutional rights to present her defense, so the admission of 
this evidence is more strongly required than in Teuscher. 
Cross-examination of the state's witnesses was inadequate to 
present the defense because Mr. Oliver's testimony went beyond the 
possible scope of cross-examination of those witnesses, and because 
defendant had the right to call witnesses for her defense. Cf. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)(conviction reversed for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in part because counsel 
failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendant's testimony). 
Because Roland Oliver's testimony was relevant, and because 
its probative value exceeded its prejudicial effect, the trial 
court should have admitted the evidence. While cross-examination 
of the State's witnesses did present evidence of the attorneys' 
shortcomings, a lay jury likely would not appreciate the 
significance of the evidence centering on legal technicalities, 
such as the serious conflicts of interest. Given the scarcity of 
other evidence available to establish the Vigils' defense to the 
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intent element of the charges, the trial court's order excluding 
Roland Oliver's testimony was prejudicial. 
In its opinion in State v. Vigil, supra, this Court contends 
that defendant's argument here is " . . . that this evidence would 
have shown that, under different circumstances, [defendant] would 
not have conducted himself as he did, . . . " Defendant here 
asserts, with all due respect, that this Court has not considered 
the full potential impact of Oliver's testimony. Defendant's claim 
here is not that, under different circumstances, she would have 
acted differently. Specific intent is an element of the crimes 
charged against her. Defendant contends that she did not intent to 
deceive anyone, as the State has claimed. She contends that the 
damaging evidence about her working with three prospective adoptive 
couples and taking money from all three is, in reality, explainable 
as conduct consistent with a different mental state other than the 
intent to deceive. Roland Oliver's testimony would have further 
established that she was being dealt with improperly by attorneys 
in a conflict of interest, without being correctly advised by an 
attorney of her rights and responsibilities in the circumstances. 
Because his testimony went to the issue of intent, Oliver should 
have been allowed as a witness. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GIVE REQUESTED DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS. 
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Over trial counsels1 objection, the trial court refused to 
give the jury requested defense Instructions 8 and 9, which quote 
portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. (R.1169). The requested instructions were as follow: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse to 
another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited 
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to 
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; 
and 
(2) the client consents after 
consultation. When representation of multiple 
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and 
the advantages and risks involved. 
(R.295). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which 
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and 
reasonable to the client and are fully 
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the 
client in a manner which can be reasonably 
understood by the client[;] 
(2) the client is given a reasonable 
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opportunity to seek the advi[c]e of 
independent counsel in the transaction[;] and 
(3) the client consents in writing 
thereto. 
(R.296). 
Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on her 
theory of the defense. Requested instructions 8 and 9 would have 
assisted in elucidating the shortcomings in the performances of the 
attorneys, Giffen and Bushman, and thus in explaining why the 
Vigils sought out successive prospective adoptive couples. 
Particularly in light of the trial court's refusal to allow the 
testimony of Roland Oliver to explain acceptable norms in 
adoptions, the absence of the requested jury instructions 
pertaining to the attorneys' deficient performances was 
prejudicial. 
Again, in the related appeal, State v. Vigil, supra, the court 
finds this analysis unpersuasive. However, in this related appeal, 
this Court fails to note that the crux of the entire case was 
whether the Vigils intended, at the moment they took the money, not 
to go forward with the adoption. Intent is always an element which 
must be proved by extrinsic facts, since we can never see inside 
the workings of a human mind at a particular moment. The extrinsic 
facts which were so damaging in this case were defendants 
negotiation for adoption with three separate couples (and three 
separate attorneys) and her taking money from three separate 
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couples. Trial counsel properly attempted to explain this to the 
jury by showing a benign explanation for this apparently damning 
evidence. Trial counsel attempted to do so by demonstrating that 
defendant had counsel in conflict in the adoption case behaving 
unethically and/or incompetently. 
This is not a situation where defendant attempted to cloud the 
issue by placing blame on the attorneys (as this Court seems to say 
in State v. Vigil opinion). Rather, this is a case where defendant 
attempted to explain that she had a non-culpable mental state, and 
that her conduct which tended to indicate an intent to deceive 
could otherwise be explained. 
The trial court failed to permit her to pursue this theory of 
defense by failing to give the two requested jury instructions 
quoting Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. A jury could not be expected to know, in a vacuum and 
without jury instructions, that it is a conflict of interest for an 
attorney to represent both sides in an adoption, or that any of the 
other conduct of counsel might be improper. Thus, the jury 
instructions were highly important to defendant's theory of the 
case, and failure to give these instructions was harmful error. 
POINT 4. THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON TWO ASPECTS 
OF DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE. 
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Since Utah law mandates that monies given to birth mothers by 
prospective adoptive parents are charitable contributions, and 
attorneys Giffen and Fineshriber advised the Vigils that the money 
from the prospective adoptive couples was legally considered to be 
a charitable contribution, the Vigils were entitled to an 
instruction embodying the law in Utah Code Ann, §76-6-402. It 
provides: 
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right 
to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he 
had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over 
the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
While John Giffen testified that he told the Vigils it was 
illegal to accept money from more than one couple, this discussion 
occurred in going over a form embodying California Law. (See 
State's Exhibit 10) . Mr. Giffen testified that he told the Vigils 
that Utah law was similar to California's. Defendant denied the 
Vigils ever discussed any such legal concept with Mr. Giffen. 
The jury also should have been instructed that " [T]heft by 
deception does not occur . . . when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance[.]" Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
405(2) . 
It was the State's theory that the Vigils deceived the 
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Bushmans, the Hallidays, and the Elizondos by falsely representing 
their intent to give up a baby for adoption. (R.7-8; 171-172). 
For instance, the probable cause statement originally filed in case 
number 931901605 provides: "The Defendants received money from 
three different couples for the baby and yet never delivered the 
child to anyone." (R. 172). As a matter of law, these 
representations had no pecuniary significance. Utah Code Ann. §76-
7-203. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE 
ERRORS. 
While trial counsel did not request these defense 
instructions, this Court should nonetheless address and rectify the 
errors, as plain error and due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Under the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate for an 
appellate court to address an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal if the error should have been obvious to the trial court and 
was prejudicial. State v. Eldredge, 77,3 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). Some errors will be addressed on 
appeal even if they should not have been plain to the trial court, 
if, in hindsight, the appellate Court recognizes a high level of 
prejudice stemming from the error. Id., 773 P.2d at 35 and n.8. 
The plain error standard is not to be applied in an overly 
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technical fashion; the rule is designed to balance the need for 
procedural regularity against the need for fairness. State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). 
The two statutes at issue here should have been obvious to the 
trial court and trial counsel. The statute limiting theft by 
deception to representations of pecuniary significance is the same 
statute which defines theft by deception. The statute setting 
forth the good faith defense to the charges is located under the 
same part of the Utah Code. The language of the statutes is plain 
and unambiguous, and directly supports the defense that both 
attorneys were attempting to assert through motions to quash the 
bindovers, to dismiss, and arguments to the jury. 
The absence of the defense instructions was prejudicial. 
There were no true defense instructions given. There is a 
substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome, had the proper 
instructions been given. As it was, the jury had before it no 
evidence and no instructions (because the trial judge failed to 
give both) explaining that defendant's conduct might be interpreted 
in view of something other than deceptive intent. Clearly, if the 
jury had had any of this theory of the case before it, it could 
have found in favor of defendant. The failure of counsel to 
request these defense instructions is, therefore, highly 
prejudicial. 
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This Court should, therefore, address the absence of the 
instructions under the plain error doctrine. See State v. Brooks, 
868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.) (discussing common standard for 
reversal on allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance 
of counsel), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a 
defendant must show [1] that trial counselfs performance 
was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective 
standard or reasonableness,' and [2] that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
(at page 822}. The prejudice prong is established if there is a 
"•reasonable probability1 that, but for counsel's errors, the 
result would have been different." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 
P.2d 136, 133 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). 
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal, the record must be sufficient for this Court to 
decide the issue, and the defendant must be represented by counsel 
different from trial counsel. Id. at 822 n4. 
Just as the need for the defense instructions should have been 
obvious to the trial court, the need also should have been obvious 
to trial counsel. The failure to request the instructions cannot 
be based upon any conceivable tactical decision, and fell below 
objective standards of reasonableness. Given the absence of any 
true defense instructions, and given the evidence in this case, 
trial counsel's failure to request the instructions was clearly 
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prejudicial. See State v. Moritzky, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 
1989)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
who requested defense instruction that failed to incorporate recent 
statute beneficial to the defense; court found no conceivable 
tactical basis for the omission); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 
P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1994) (conviction reversed because trial counsel 
failed to request defense instruction authorized by the Code). 
POINT 5. AS A MATTER OF LAW, CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS CANNOT BE THE OBJECT 
OF THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
Charitable contributions may not be the object of theft by 
deception, as a matter of law. 
Theft by deception is defined by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405. By 
the plain language of the statute, theft by deception does not 
occur when the matters which are the subject of the deception have 
no pecuniary significance. As noted above, under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-7-203, consent to adopt can have no pecuniary significance. 
An element of the offense of theft by deception is reliance by 
the victims. State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982). Because 
the victims in the context of an adoption cannot rely on the birth 
parents to consent to the adoption, as a matter of law, (Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203) , there is no reliance causing them to part with 
their money, and theft by deception cannot occur. Jones. 
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The statute characterizing monies from prospective adoptive 
parents as charitable contributions, Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203, 
would also provide a basis for the statutory good faith defenses to 
theft by deception provided in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(3), cited 
above. 
Because the facts here cannot constitute the crime of theft by 
deception under Utah law, this Court must dismiss this case. 
POINT 6. THE STATUTORY SCHEME AS APPLIED TO 
DEFENDANT IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
Defendant, pursuant to Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution is entitled to due process of law. Further, pursuant 
to the United States Constitution, the defendant is also entitled 
to due process of law. 
If a law or statutory scheme is so vague that it does not 
provide adequate notice to a citizen of prohibited conduct which 
may give rise to a criminal prosecution, then the statute is void 
for vagueness, in violation of guarantees of due process. Salt 
Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975), cert, den. 425 U.S. 
915 (1976) . 
In this particular case, defendant is advised by one statute 
of the State of Utah that monies given to her as a birth mother in 
anticipation of adoption are a charitable contribution, and under 
no set of circumstances can bind her to the adoption. The logical 
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extension of this is that no prospective adoptive parent can rely 
upon a promise to consent to an adoption. 
On the other hand, defendant has been prosecuted for theft by 
deception for receiving money under exactly these circumstances. 
This whole statutory scheme, as applied to defendant in this case, 
is void for vagueness because it does not put a citizen on notice 
adequately of potential criminal conduct. 
If the legislature wanted to make this clear it could easily 
adopt a law similar to the California statute about which defendant 
was advised making it illegal to accept money from a prospective 
adoptive parent without present intent to consent to the adoption. 
The legislature could also make this clear by adopting a law making 
it illegal to accept money from more than one set of prospective 
adoptive parents at a time. These laws do not exit in Utah, 
however. Since they do not, defendant has been prosecuted under a 
unconstitutionally vague statutory schemes. 
It should be noted that the opinion in State v. Vigil, supra, 
does not address this issue for vagueness, and is, therefore, not 
dispositive. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant requests that this case be dismissed. In the 
alternative, she seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is 
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and she is allowed to 
present her full defense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (j day of August, 1996. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON * V K 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Thomas M. Vigil appeals a jury verdict convicting 
him of three counts of theft by deception, one third degree 
felony and two second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995). We affirm. 
I. FACTS 
Defendant is appealing from a jury verdict; thus we recite 
the facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, "but 
present conflicting evidence io the extent necessary to clarify 
the issues raised on appeal." State v. Winward. 909 P. 2d 909, 
910 (Utah App. 1995). 
A. The Elizondcs 
In early November 1992, John Giffen, an adoption attorney in 
St. George, Utah, received a phone call from defendant's wife, 
Tonya Vigil, a co-defendant in this case. Tonya informed Giffen 
that she was expecting a child March 27, 1993, and that she and 
defendant, the child's father, wished to place the baby for 
adoption. Giffen explained to Tonya the procedure for a private 
adoption and offered to have Saunya Schuchart, his paralegal who 
resided in Salt Lake City where the Vigil's were living, meet 
with her and show her several "resumes"1 of potential adoptive 
families. 
Schuchart met with defendant and his wife at a local 
restaurant, provided them with the resumes, and explained the 
adoption process. The Vigils chose Frank and Stephanie Elizondo, 
a California couple, from the resumes as the prospective adoptive 
parents. At this meeting, defendant asked Schuchart whether the 
Vigils could receive financial assistance for living and medical 
expenses during the pregnancy. Schuchart assured him that they 
could. 
After the Vigils had chosen the Elizondos as the adoptive 
parents, Frank Elizondo contacted Tonya by phone. The two 
conversed to get acquainted. At this time, Frank agreed to send 
Giffen money to assist the Vigils with their living expenses. 
Because neither defendant nor Tonya were working, the Elizondos 
agreed to pay for their living expenses until defendant found 
employment. At that time, the financial assistance would be 
reduced by the amount defendant was earning. Giffen would 
deposit the money received from Frank into a trust account, which 
would then be used to assist the Vigils when needed. Either 
defendant or Tonya would call Schuchart and request money; she 
would then contact Giffen. Giffen would transfer Frank's money 
into a Salt Lake City bank account from which Schuchart could 
draw the necessary amount.2 Frank initially forwarded $1200 on 
November 5th to help defendant and Tonya get into an apartment. 
After the initial meeting, Schuchart again met with the 
Vigils when defendant called requesting that she assist them in 
locating an apartment. An apartment was found and Schuchart gava* 
defendant two checks, presumably to cover rent. However, Tonya 
called Schuchart one or two days later and told her defendant had 
left and taken the checks without paying for the apartment. 
Schuchart stopped payment on the checks. 
1. The "resumes" are pictures and biographical sketches of the 
couples attempting to adopt a child. 
2. All checks were made payable to Tonya, not defendant. 
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Schuchart did not hear from the Vigils for approximately two 
and a half weeks. When Tonya finally made contact with 
Schuchart, Schuchart again helped the two find an apartment. 
Because of the Vigils' poor credit history, the landlord required 
Giffen to personally guarantee rent for four months. 
Giffen met with the Vigils in either late November or early 
December. Along with a medical record release form, Giffen had 
the Vigils sign a "Waiver of Consent of Interest." Giffen 
explained that because he represents both the Elizondos and the 
Vigils, there was a potential conflict of interest and, 
therefore, he needed to get their permission to represent: both 
parties. Giffen also discussed a document with the Vigils 
entitled "The Illegality Pitfalls in Adoptions." The document 
informs birth parents what they can and cannot do regarding the 
adoption. Giffen advised the Vigils that receiving money from 
adoptive parents for pregnancy related expenses did not mean that 
consent for the adoption had to be given. Additionally, Giffen 
told them it was illegal to take money from an adoptive couple if 
they did not intend to go through with the adoption and it was 
illegal for the birth parents to take money from more than one 
prospective adoptive couple. Although the document covered 
California law, Giffen told the Vigils that Utah had the same 
type of laws. Both defendant and Tonya signed this document. 
In the middle of December, Giffen received a phone call from 
defendant, who requested that Giffen pay him the rent for January-
early so that he and Tonya could buy "Christmas presents, and 
clothes and things." Defendant assured Giffen he would take care 
of the January rent himself if Giffen would release the funds. 
Based on this conversation, Giffen sent $375 on December 11th and 
$125 on December 14th to cover the holiday expenses. 
Notwithstanding defendant's premise, the Vigils failed to pay 
January's rent, which was ultimately paid a second time by the 
Elizondos. 
During the middle of February 1993, the Elizondos visited 
the Vigils in Salt Lake City. Schuchart picked the Elizondos up 
at the airport and dropped them off at the Vigils' apartment. 
The four went to lunch and after some sightseeing, Tonya 
suggested they visit the hospital maternity ward where she 
anticipated the baby would be born. Tonya also gave Stephanie a 
baby blanket which a friend had made for Tonya's baby. Defendant 
then dropped the Elizondos off at the airport. Both Frank and 
Tonya testified the visit went well. 
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After this visit, Frank received a phone call from 
defendant, who requested that Frank start sending the money 
directly to defendant, bypassing Giffen. Defendant also 
requested that Frank change attorneys, stating he was not happy 
with Giffen because defendant wanted to control the money and 
Giffen did not allow it. Frank told defendant he was bound 
contractually to Giffen and could not change attorneys. 
Subsequent to this conversation, defendant called Frank again and 
requested $1500 to buy a car. Frank told defendant that he did 
not have that kind of money and, in any event, the money had to 
go through Giffen and had to be for pregnancy related items. 
Defendant became angry and told Frank not to tell Giffen about 
the request. 
Toward the end of February, Giffen received another phone 
call from defendant. Defendant again requested that the March 
rent be sent early and that it be sent directly to defendant, as 
opposed to the landlord. Giffen resisted and defendant hung up 
on him. Defendant called again the next day, insisting that he 
needed the money. Giffen relented and had Schuchart write a 
check to Tonya, which was done on February 24th. A few short 
weeks after this transaction took place, defendant again called 
Giffen stating that he needed money for the March ren:.3 After 
Giffen reminded defendant that they had already paid rent for 
March, defendant replied that he spent the money on his car. 
When Giffen told defendant he did not think they could pay the 
rent again, defendant got angry and hung up on Giffen. Giffen 
spoke with Frank, who again sent money to cover the rent for 
March. 
Frank continued to call the Vigils numerous times a week to 
check on Tonya's status. Although he was able to talk to Tonya a 
few times, the majority of the conversations were with defendant, 
who told Frank that Tonya was resting. Toward the middle of 
March, Frank began calling almost every day, anxious about the 
baby's arrival. Frank had discussed with the Vigils the 
arrangements for picking up the baby; when Tonya went into labor, 
either she or defendant was to call Frank. As soon as Frank 
received word, he and Stephanie would take the next flight into 
Salt Lake City and meet the Vigils at the hospital. 
3. Giffen also received a phone call from the landlord 
complaining that the March rent had not been paid. 
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At one point, Frank was unable to reach either defendant or 
Tonya for a full day.4 Anticipating that Tonya had gone into 
labor, Frank called the hospital, where he talked to defendant. 
Defendant assured Frank that Tonya was only there for a routine 
check-up. Frank called again the following Monday and spoke to 
defendant. Defendant told Frank that Tonya was resting. When 
Frank asked defendant when Tonya's next doctor appointment was, 
defendant replied that it was Tuesday. Frank phoned again on 
Tuesday and defendant stated than the appointment had been moved 
to Wednesday. When Frank called on Wednesday, he discovered that 
the Vigils' phone had been disconnected. 
w The last conversation Giffen had with defendant was on or 
about March 18th. Defendant called Giffen and told him that they 
had not paid their utility bills for several months and, as a 
result, the utility companies were threatening to turn them off. 
Giffen had Schuchart confirm this with the utility companies, and 
the Elizondos ultimately paid for the phone and electric bill. 
Schuchart issued a check to the Vigils on March 18th for $150 to 
cover groceries. On the same day, Schuchart wrote a check to the 
phone company, stuck the check in the envelope with the bill, 
sealing it. Schuchart also deposited $250 with the landlord on 
March 19th for a cleaning fee deposit. 
After delivering this money to the Vigils, Schuchart 
received a phone call from Frank, who asked that she investigate 
why the phone had been disconnected. Schuchart, knowing that she 
had just paid the phone bill, wen: ever to the apartment on the 
Thursday following Frank's last phone call to the Vigils, where 
defendant let her in. After approximately 2 0 minutes, defendant 
brought out a newborn baby girl and introduced her as Alexandria., 
Defendant informed Schuchart that he and Tonya had decided to 
keep the baby. When Schuchart asked when the baby was born, 
defendant said that she was born :wo days ago.s After learning 
this, Schuchart informed Frank. The Elizondos had paid 
4. The date and/or the day of the week is unclear. 
5. The baby was born on March 18, 1993. 
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approximately $43006 toward the Vigils1 living expenses during 
Tonya's pregnancy. 
B. The Bushmans 
Rex Bushman, an attorney who occasionally assists with 
adoptions, received a phone call from Tonya asking if Bushman was 
an adoption attorney. Tonya made an appointment with Bushman 
and, on February 24, 1993, the Vigils met with him at his office. 
The Vigils expressed their desire to find a couple to adopt their 
unborn child. Bushman replied that he and his wife would like to 
adopt a baby. Although they already had four children, they 
wished to have more and were unable to. Both defendant and Tonya 
stated they were amenable to this idea. The Vigils did not 
inform Bushman that they were receiving money from the Elizondos 
or that they had been working with Giffen. 
At this initial meeting, Bushman had the Vigils sign an 
agreement stating that Bushman would find a suitable family to 
adopt the baby. Additionally, because the Vigils had said they 
were unable to pay for the medical expenses concerning the birth 
of the child, Bushman offered to pay the costs associated 
therewith. 
The three met again on March 5th at Bushman's office. At 
this time, two more agreements were entered into. The first 
concerned an agreement that if the adoption did not go through, 
the Vigils would reimburse Bushman the expenses he had paid them. 
The second document was a "Waiver of Conflict of Interest.'1 
Perceiving a potential conflict because he was one of the 
adopting parents and also the attorney representing the Vigils, 
Bushman explained this fact to the Vigils and had them sign the 
waiver. 
Prior to the March 5th meeting, Bushman received a call frcjm 
defendant stating that he and Tonya needed some assistance with 
living expenses. Bushman requested that defendant determine how 
much he needed and call him back. Defendant did so, informing 
6. The Elizondos sent $1200 on November 5th, 1992, approximately 
$1000 in December for January's rent, $375 for rent and $50 for 
clothes on February 1st, $100 for utilities on February 18th, 
$500 for rent and other expenses on February 24th, $500 for rent 
and utilities on March 8th, $50 for clothing on or about March 
10th, $150 for food and $82.24 for the phone bill on March 18th, 
and $250 for the cleaning deposit on March 19th. 
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Bushman that they needed $1500 to cover rent, utilities, and 
groceries. 
When the Vigils met with Bushman on March 5th, he had 
prepared another document reflecting the parties1 agreement that 
he was giving them $500 for living expenses7 and would give them 
a balance of $1000 after the baby was born and the Vigils gave 
their consent for the adoption. 
Bushman remained in contact with the Vigils after the March 
5th meeting, expecting the baby to be born soon. On or after 
March 19th, Bushman called the Vigils and spoke with Tonya. 
Tonya assured Bushman at this time that the adoption would still 
proceed as agreed, never revealing that the baby had been born on 
March 18th or that they had decided to keep the baby. When 
Bushman tried to contact the Vigils again, he discovered that 
their phone had been disconnected. 
C. The Hallidays 
Marilyn Fineshriber, an attorney who has a limited practice 
in the adoption area, received a phone call from Tonya on either 
March 3rd or 4th of 1993. Tonya asked Fineshriber general 
questions regarding the adoption procedure and stated that she 
was expecting and was interested in placing her baby for 
adoption. Tonya made an appointment with Fineshriber to discuss 
the matter further. 
The parties met on or about March 7th. They discussed the 
type of adoptive family with whom the Vigils were interested in 
placing their baby, the financial aid this family may be able to 
give the Vigils, and the Vigils' medical background. Fineshriber 
was told that the baby was due March 2 8th. Neither defendant nor 
Tonya mentioned to Fineshriber that they were receiving money 
from two other couples in connection with the baby's adoption. 
After the initial meeting, Fineshriber spoke with Paul and 
Vicki Halliday concerning their interest in adopting the Vigils' 
baby. After the Hallidays expressed a desire to adopt the baby, 
Fineshriber informed the Vigils, who agreed to the adoption. The 
Hallidays gave the Vigils $900 on March 12th to help them with 
7. Bushman gave them two checks; one for $3 90 for rent and 
another for $110 for utilities and/or groceries. This was the 
third check the Vigils received for their March rent. 
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living expenses8 and agreed to pay them $600 in April after the 
baby was born. Both defendant and Tonya picked up the check at 
Fineshriber's office. 
After March 12th, Fineshriber spoke on the phone with both 
defendant and Tonya several times concerning how Tonya was 
feeling, her due date, and doctor visits. Fineshriber spoke with 
Tonya on March 23rd, and at this point Tonya did not inform 
Fineshriber that the baby had been born, but said only that the 
adoption would go forward as scheduled. 
On March 25th, defendant contacted Fineshriber and told her 
that they needed more money because the phone had been 
disconnected and they were behind in paying their other 
utilities. Fineshriber asked defendant if they still planned to 
proceed with the adoption because that was the only way the money 
would be available. Defendant assured her that they were, but 
did not mention that the baby had been born. Fineshriber spoke 
with the Hallidays, who agreed to give the Vigils an additional-
$600. Defendant picked up this check on March 26th. 
After defendant picked up the check on March 2 6th, 
Fineshriber attempted to contact the Vigils, but was unable to 
because their phone had been disconnected. Fineshriber did not 
speak with the Vigils again until the end of March or first of 
April, when defendant called and told Fineshriber that they had 
decided not to go through with the adoption but that they had not 
intended to deceive anyone. At this time, defendant told 
Fineshriber that they had been receiving money from the 
Elizondos. 
In August 1993, defendant was charged by information on 
three counts of theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995). A trial was held in April 1994. 
Tonya testified to the events surrounding the adoption. 
Although she was satisfied with the Elizondos as prospective 
parents, Tonya testified that she became dissatisfied with Giffen 
and Schuchart. Tonya stated that she wanted the Elizondos to 
have the baby, but because they could not switch attorneys, she 
decided she could not go through with the adoption. This 
decision was made shortly after the Elizondos visited Salt Lake 
City. Tonya did not inform the Elizondos, Giffen, or Schuchart 
8. The Vigils had told Fineshriber that because they were unable 
to afford their March rent, they were about to be evicted. 
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of this decision. Furthermore, even though she had decided not 
to go through with the adoption with the Elizondos, Tonya 
testified that they continued to solicit funds from them. 
Tonya stated that after she decided she was not going to 
continue the adoptive relationship with the Elizondos, she looked 
in the yellow pages for another adoption attorney. Although she 
agreed with Bushman's testimony that they had agreed to let 
Bushman adopt their baby, she stated that he later changed his 
mind and said he would find a family after the baby was born. 
Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Tonya went looking for 
another attorney.9 
Tonya then spoke with Fineshriber regarding the possible 
adoption and ultimately agreed to have the Hallidays adopt the 
baby. Although Tonya testified that she was prepared to let the 
Hallidays adopt the baby, after the baby was born on March 18th, 
she decided she could not give the baby up for adoption. Tonya 
stated that she did not talk to any of the adoptive parents or 
attorneys after the baby was born and did not call any of them to 
inform them of the birth. When asked why she did net return the 
money received from Fineshriber after the baby was born, Tonya 
replied, "I dicta11 have a phone and I just had a baby and I just 
know I didn't." 
The jury convicted defendant on all three counts. Defendant 
aooeals. 
II. ISSUES 
Defendant raises numerous issues on appeal: whether (1) 
the trial court erred by concluding that theft by deception 
occurs in an adoption context; (2) the trial court adequately 
conducted voir dire; (3) the trial court erred by excluding 
defendant's evidence; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to 
give two of defendant's proposed instructions to the jury; and 
(5) defendant's trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
request a jury instruction regarding possible statutory defenses 
to theft by deception or, if we determine that defendant's trial 
counsel was not ineffective, whether the trial court committed 
plain error by not submitting the instructions to the jury sua 
9. However, Tonya testified that she did not learn of Bushman's 
change of heart until their second meeting, which was March 5th. 
Tonya called Fineshriber on either March 3rd or 4th. 
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sponte. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Theft By Deception in the Adoption Context 
We begin our analysis by addressing defendant's claim on 
appeal that theft by deception, as codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-405 (1995) , cannot, as a matter of law, occur in adoption 
proceedings. Because theft by deception cannot occur in an 
adoption setting, defendant argues, the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury on that issue. Whether the trial court 
properly determined and instructed the jury that theft by 
deception can occur in adoption settings are questions of law, 
which we review for correctness, giving the trial court no 
particular deference. State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
Defendant's argument is premised on the juxtaposition of the 
statutory language for theft by deception and payment of adoption 
expenses. Theft by deception is statutorily defined as follows: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995) .I0 
Section 76-7-203, which forbids the sale of children but 
permits the payment of pregnancy-related expenses, provides: 
Any person, while having custody, care, 
control, or possession of any child, who 
sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or 
dispose of, any child for and in 
10. The jury instructions numbered 20, 22, and 24 set out the 
elements of theft by deception. The statutory definition of 
deception was set out in instruction number 26. 
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consideration of the payment of money or 
other thing of value is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree. However, this section does 
not prohibit any person, agency, or -
corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity 
expenses, related medical or hospital, and 
necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement as an act of 
charity, so long as payment is not made for 
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, 
or legal guardian to place the child for 
adoption, consent to an adoption, or 
cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Id. § 76-7-203 (1995). 
Defendant first argues that because the money given to the 
birth parents is considered a charitable contribution pursuant to 
section 76-7-203, and not consideration for the birth parents' 
promise to place the child for adoption, there can be no 
reliance, an essential element of theft by deception, by the 
prospective adoptive parents which would induce them to part with 
their money. Secondly, according to defendant, as a matter of 
law fl[t]he birth parents cannot purvey any deception, because the 
object of their representations, the baby, cannot be sold, and 
thus has no pecuniary significance." Furthermore, since the 
funds given the birth parents are charitable contributions, they 
similarly have no pecuniary significance. We find defendant's 
arguments unpersuasive. 
The statutory definition of deception is found at section 
76-6-401(5) of the Utah Code which, in pertinent part, provides, 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of . . . fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to 
be true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely 
to affect the judgment of another in the 
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transaction, which performance the actor does 
not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed; provided however, that failure to 
perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise would 
not be performed. 
I&u § 76-6-401(5) (1995). 
This court has previously enumerated three separate 
components of the deception element: 
(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the 
statutory definition of deception, (2) that 
the deception occurred contemporaneously with 
the transaction in question, and (3) that the 
victim relied upon the deception, at least to 
some extent, in parting with property. 
State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (UtahApp.), cert, denied. 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) . 
Defendant is correct in stating that prospective adoptive 
couples cannot be guaranteed that the birth parents will give up 
the baby for adoption when they agree to pay for expenses, 
because any funds given to the birth parents cannot be used to 
induce them into consenting to the adoption, but can only, by 
law, be considered a charitable contribution. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-203 (1995); cf. State v. Lakev, 659 ?.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 
1983) ("an unfulfilled promise of future performance will not 
suffice as a false representation of fact"). However, 
defendant's claim that adoptive parents cannot rely on the birth 
parents' present intent to place the baby for adoption, even 
though legally revocable in the future, is misplaced.11 To the 
contrary, "'[t]he [statement of future conduct] is regarded as a 
representation of a present intention to perform. Hence, such a 
[statement] , made by one not intending to perform operates as a 
misrepresentation--a misrepresentation of the speaker's state of 
11. Defendant's claim is also contradictory to the position he 
took at trial. Defendant proposed an instruction which 
essentially stated that accepting money from prospective adoptive 
parents does not "subject [defendant] to criminal responsibility 
unless . . . fdefendantl never had the intention of consenting to 
the adoption of the child." (Emphasis added.) 
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mind, at the time, and is actionable as a misrepresentation of 
"fact."1" Conder v. A.L. Williams ^Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 640 
(Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted);12 see also, Lakeyf 659 P.2d 
at 1064 (staring section 76-6-401(5) "specifies circumstances in 
which a prcr.ise of future performance can be an element of the 
crime" of theft by deception). Thus, the adoptive parents are 
entitled to rely on the birth parents' representations of their 
present intent to place the baby for adoption, even though this 
decision is revocable. If, at the time they obtained funds from 
the prospective adoptive parents, the birth parents did not 
intend to place the baby for adoption, they fall within the 
definition cf deception, because the promised performance--to 
give the baby up for adoption--which the birth parents knew to be 
false at the time they made the promise, a'ffected the judgment of 
the adoptive parents when they decided to pay expenses to the 
birth parents. Quite clearly, prospective adoptive parents would 
not part with their money knowing that, at the time the money is 
paid, the birth parents do not intend to give the baby up for 
adoption. 
Defendant also claims that because the child is the object 
of his alleged misrepresentations, and by law a baby cannot be 
sold, any funds given to the birth parents are considered 
charitable contributions. Therefore, defendant asserts the 
representations have no pecuniary significance, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995), and defendant cannot be found guilty of 
theft by deception as a matter of law. Defendant's argument is 
meritless. Although the child is the "bait" used, the false 
representations of the birth parents regarding their present 
intent to place the child for adoption have substantial pecuniary 
significance: the resulting financial support from the 
prospective adoptive parents, whether characterized as a 
charitable contribution or not. 
Finally, it is important to note that section 76-7-203 
prohibits the payment of money to induce the "mother, parent, or 
leaal guardian to place the child for adoption." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-203 (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no conflict 
between sections 76-7-203 and 76-6-405 where, as here, the 
inducement was the false representation made by the "parents" SLQ. 
the prospective adoptive parents. Thus, the outcome defendant 
urges, to allow birth parents to collect money from unsuspecting 
potential adoptive parents based en their false representations, 
12. Although Conder was a civil fraud case, we find the analysis 
to be persuasive in the criminal theft by deception context. 
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is absurd. 3irth parents would be legally allowed to falsely 
induce persons who are trying to adopt into paying their medical 
expenses, living expenses, and maternity expenses. This is 
certainly not the result contemplated by section 76-7-203. 
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in 
concluding that theft by deception can occur in an adoption 
setting and, therefore, properly instructed the jury on this 
issue, 
B. Voir Dire 
Defendant challenges two aspects of the trial court's voir 
di're. Defendant first claims the trial court erred in refusing 
to ask two questions proposed by defendant. Secondly, defendant 
claims the trial court committed error in refusing to conduct 
further voir dire of two potential jurors when they acknowledged 
exposure to media regarding failed adoptions. 
We review defendant's challenge to the trial court's voir 
dire for an abuse of discretion. Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 
96, 98 (Utah App. 1993) . Although the trial court is afforded 
broad discretion during voir dire, the "'discretion must be 
exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice 
in prospective jurors.*" Id. (quoting State v. Kail, 797 P.2d 
470, 472 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)). 
We will not disturb "a trial court's discretionary rejection of 
voir dire questions" unless the trial court abused its discretion 
and the abuse "'rose to the level of reversible error.'" Id. 
(quoting Hall, 797 P. 2d at 472) . Reversible error occurs when, 
after reviewing the totality of the questioning, we conclude that 
trial counsel was not given "'"an adequate opportunity to gain 
the information necessary to evaluate jurors."'" Id. (quoting 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439-** 
448 (Utah 1988))). There are two purposes behind voir dire. The 
process first allows trial counsel to discover any biases an 
individual juror may have which would support a challenge for 
cause. Evans, 824 P.2d at 462. Voir dire also allows counsel to 
gather sufficient information to allow them to intelligently 
exercise a peremptory challenge. Id. 
After the trial court had completed the first round of voir 
dire, counsel was given the opportunity to state their objections 
and request further questions. Defendant requested that the 
trial court ask his proposed questions numbered twenty-seven and 
twenty-eight. Question twenty-seven stated: 
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If, after hearing the evidence you came 
to the conclusion that the prosecution had 
not proven the guilt of the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and you found that a 
majority of the jurors believed the defendant 
was guilty, would you change your verdict 
only because you were in the minority? 
Question twenty-eight stated: 
Are there any of you who are not in such 
a fair and impartial state of mind that you 
would not be satisfied to have a juror 
possessing your mental state judge the 
evidence if you or your loved ones were on 
trial here? In other words, would you want 
someone with your state of mind sitting as a 
juror on a case if you were the defendant? 
The trial court refused to ask the proposed questions, stating 
"the Court is satisfied that it has covered that matter in 
substance and the questions have been put to the panel." 
Defendant claims that, considering the " ftotality of the 
questioning, ' . . . this Court can see that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to ask these two questions, 
because voir dire never addressed whether the prospective jurors 
felt that they were generally fair and impartial, and whether 
they would maintain their independence in the deliberation 
process, or succumb to pressure from a majority." However, 
defendant has not claimed the trial court's refusal to ask 
questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight denied him "'an adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate [the] 
jurors,,n Barrett, 868 P. 2d at 98 (citation emitted), or 
prevented him from either exercising a peremptory challenge or 
discerning any bias on behalf of a potential juror supporting a 
for-cause challenge. See Evans, 824 P. 2d at 462. Defendant 
merely asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not 
putting the question to the prospective jurors. Without any 
analysis on the issue, we fail to see the basis of defendant's 
contention.13 It is well settled that an apellate court is not 
13. In his reply brief, defendant argues the legal authority 
cited in the introductory section to his voir dire argument 
fulfilled his briefing obligation. However, citing cases 
regarding the general law of voir dire does not form the basis of 
(continued...) 
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"*a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden 
of argument and research.1" State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) 
("[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented") (emphasis 
added). Thus, even if defendant's argument had merit, because 
defendant did not clearly analyze the issue, we decline to 
address it on appeal. 
Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion 
when it failed to further question two jurors who said they had 
been exposed to media coverage in response to the following 
question: "Have any of you see[n] any recent television 
programs, or received other information, depicting attempted 
adoptions? What did you hear?" After the question was posed to 
the potential jurors, several raised their hands. Two potential 
jurors, Wylie and Reese, answered "yes" to the question and 
ultimately served on the jury. 
The colloquy between Wylie and the trial court was as 
follows: 
The Court: . . . And Ms. Wylie, what program 
was it? 
Ms. Wylie: I don't know. Just a 
documentary. 
The Court: How long ago was that? 
Ms. Wylie: Within six months and then in the 
Ladies Home Journal I think there was an 
article too. 
The Court: Do you recall the subject matter 
of the documentary or the article in the 
Ladies Home Journal? 
Ms. Wylie: I just knew its adoption and then 
they changed their mind. 
(...continued) 
a legal argument sufficient to put this court on notice of the 
grounds of a party's complaint. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) 
(M[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented") (emphasis 
added). 
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The Court: Was that the subject matter of 
those issues? 
Ms. Wylie: Uli-huh. 
The Court: Let me ask you this question, Ms, 
Wylie. As a result of the documentary or the 
article in the magazine, and considering the 
nature of today's case, would any of that 
information interfere with your 
responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
Ms. Wylie: No, not really. 
The Court: You are certain you could remain 
fair and impartial to both sides of this 
story? 
Ms. Wylie: I think, yes. 
The Court: Obviously, you use the word 
"think." Do you have a hesitation? 
Ms. Wylie: I don't remember the story in 
that detail, you know. I think I can listen 
impartially. 
The following dialogue occurred between the trial court and 
Reese: 
Ms. Reese: . . . I watched a television 
program documentary within the last three 
months "Attempted .Adoption." 
The Court: Do you remember the thrust or 
major points of the program you saw? 
Ms. Reese: The major thing was that the 
child was up for adoption and then their 
minds were changed and the natural parents 
got the child back. 
The Court: Would any of that information 
interfere with your abilities to be fair and 
impartial to both sides of this lawsuit, Ms. 
Reese? 
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Ms. Reese: No. 
Defendant's counsel objected to the trial court's refusal to 
question jurors Reese and Wylie further, stating, "I felt that we 
needed to question them further regarding what the program was 
they saw and how they felt about it." The court, however, was 
"of the opinion that the totality of the questions put to all of 
the panel members, as well as those two panel members in 
particular, was appropriate and sufficient." We agree. 
Not only was the basis of defendant's objection covered in 
the colloquy between the court and Reese and Wylie, but the trial 
court persevered in its line of questioning to ensure that the 
two would be fair and impartial. This taken together with other 
voir dire questions14 asked of the potential jurors gave 
defendant " '"an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors."1'1 Barrett. 8S8 P. 2d at 98 
(citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to further question these two jurors. 
C. Defense Witness 
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding the testimony of his defense witness, Roland Oliver. 
Oliver's testimony was relevant, defendant argues, because it 
would have shown that Giffen and Bushman provided incompetent 
adoption services to defendant and his wife and, therefore, 
caused defendant's behavior. The trial court excluded Oliver's 
evidence as irrelevant under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and, in the alternative, as having the tendency to 
mislead and/or confuse the jury under Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence.15 
Rule 402 provides that "[a]11 relevant evidence is 
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of 
14. Other voir dire questions posed to the potential jurors 
included whether they had been victims of theft related crimes or 
whether they had any experience with adoption proceedings. 
15. While defendant attempts to advance a constitutional 
argument regarding the exclusion of Oliver's testimony, he did 
not do so before the trial court. "Accordingly, we limit our 
analysis to the Utah Rules of Evidence implicated by 
[defendant's] arguments to the trial court." Statp v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App. ) , cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991) . 
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Evidence provides: "'Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Svid. 401. 
A trial court is accorded broad discretion in determining 
whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will disturb that 
determination only if the trial court has abused that discretion. 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
We agree with the trial court that Oliverfs testimony was 
irrelevant to the issues before the court. Defendant's trial 
counsel advised the court that Oliver would have testified 
that adoption agencies, because they are 
certified by the state and required to do 
these things, perform certain services to 
adopting parents and to mothers who wish to 
place their children for adoption. We feel 
that had some of these procedures existed in 
this case, that the problems that occurred 
here would not have happened. 
Defendant's argument that this evidence would have shown 
that, under different circumstances, he would not have conducted 
himself as he did, is without merit. What is relevant to the 
issues at hand is whether defendant, under the facts of the case, 
intended to obtain the three couples' money by falsely claiming 
that he intended to give his unborn child up for adoption. It is 
wholly irrelevant what defendant "may" have dene under different 
circumstances and, as the State correctly points out, purely 
speculative. This is especially true given the fact that 
adoptions through a state licensed adoption agency have an 
entirely different set of procedures in place than those done 
through a private attorney. While the procedures Oliver was 
prepared to testify to may well be "proper adoption procedures" 
through a state licensed agency, this is not relevant to whether 
the procedures followed by Giffen or Bushman in the private 
adoption arena were proper or defendant's intent at the time he 
obtained money from the victims. Accordingly, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Oliver's 
testimony was irrelevant under Rule 402. 
Even if we were to conclude that Oliver's testimony was 
relevant and therefore admissible under Rule 402, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony under 
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Rule 403. Rule 403 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]lthough 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. "If the 
evidence has an unusually strong propensity to . . . mislead a 
jury, we require a showing of unusual probative value before it 
is admissible under rule 403." State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 
1191 (Utah 1995). "The trial court has 'considerable freedom 
. . . to make [Rule 403] decisions which appellate judges might 
not make themselves ab initio but will net reverse.1" State v. 
Blubauch, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 
P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 
(Utah 1994)). This court will not reverse a trial court's Rule 
4ff3" determination absent an abuse of discretion. Trover, 910 
P.2d at 1191; Blubauch, 904 P.2d at 699. A trial court abuses 
its discretion if its Rule 403 ruling is "'beyond the limits of 
reasonability.'" Trover, 910 P.2d at 1191 (quoting State v. 
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993)); accord Blubauah. 904 P.2d 
at 699. 
Here the proposed testimony clearly had a strong propensity 
to confuse and/or mislead the jury. Emphasizing what defendant 
characterizes as misdoings by the attorneys based on wholly 
dissimilar procedures in a state licensed adoption agency only 
clouds the real issue before the court--defendantfs intent to 
obtain the victims' money by deception. Additionally, defendant 
has failed to show this court that dissimilar procedures between 
a state licensed adoption agency and a private adoption attorney 
have an unusual probative value, thereby outweighing the strong 
propensity of the evidence to confuse or mislead the jury. Thus, 
the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence under Rule 403 
was not "'beyond the limits of reasonability,'" see Troyer, 910 
P. 2d at 1191 (citation omitted), and we affirm it on appeal. 
D. Failure to Give Requested Instructions 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to 
submit to the jury two instructions proposed by defense counsel. 
We review the trial court's failure to give requested jury 
instructions for correctness, granting the trial court no 
particular deference in its determination. Ong Int'1 U.S.A. Inc. 
v. 11th Ave. Corp. , 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); Ar.cterson v-
Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 
426 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant submitted proposed instructions numbered eight and 
nine which quote portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules 
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of Professional Conduct. On appeal and in support of his claim 
that the trial court erred in refusing to give the proposed jury 
instructions, defendant merely states that these instructions 
"would have assisted defense counsel in elucidating the 
shortcomings in the performance of the attorneys Giffen and 
Bushman, and thus in explaining why the Vigils sought out 
successive prospective adoptive couples.11 There is no further 
analysis, insufficient citation to legal authorities, and no 
citation to the record upon which defendant relies. It is well 
established that this court will decline to consider an argument 
that a party has failed to adequately brief. See State v. Price. 
909 P.2d 256, 2S3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1996). 3ecause of the inadequate analysis, we decline to 
address defendant's claim on appeal. 
E. Failure to Request/Give Statutory Defense Instructions 
Notwithstanding the competence of trial counsel and the 
trial court's alleged errors with regard to the foregoing issues, 
defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because 
he failed to request jury instructions setting out the statutory 
defenses to theft by deception. Because trial counsel did not 
request such instructions, defendant asserts his trial counsel 
was ineffective and/or the trial court committed plain error. 
Section 76-6-402 of the Utah Code provides three defenses to 
theft by deception: 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the 
actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right 
to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he 
had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over 
the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995) . 
Section 76-6-405 provides: 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
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matters having no pecuniary significance 
IflL. § 76-6-405(2) . 
It is well established that in order to succeed on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. 
State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995). If this court 
determines that "it is easier to dispose of the issue on" the 
second element enumerated above, then we may do so without 
reaching the first element. Price, 909 F.2d at 264. 
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails 
because he made no attempt to show uhis court how the outcome of 
the trial would have been different had the instructions been-
submitted to the jury. Defendant simply states, "Given the 
absence of any true defense instructions, and given the evidence 
in this case, trial counsel's failure to request the instructions 
was also prejudicial." This is insufficient to show that had 
trial counsel submitted the instructions, the outcome of 
defendant's trial would have been different and does not merit a 
reversal of defendant's conviction. See Stare v. Archuleta. 747 
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim failed based on defendant's failure to show 
prejudice). 
Alternatively, defendant argues that even if failure to 
request the instructions did not: amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel, it was plain error for the trial court not to have 
submitted the above defenses to the jury. In order to 
demonstrate plain error, defendant must shew (1) error, (2) that 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) 
that the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, S50 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993); State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996). 
Defendant argues that because the statutory language in 
sections 76-6-402 and 76-6-405 is clear and unambiguous it was 
error to fail to instruct on the defenses and that error "should 
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have been plain to the trial court." Even if we assume it was 
error to fail to provide the jury the statutory defenses to theft 
by deception, this failure was far from obvious, defendant's 
trial counsel pursued a consistent defense theory throughout the 
trial proceedings, namely, that defendant's conduct was based on 
the attorneys' misdeeds.:s Indeed, during an argument to the 
trial court, defense counsel stated, "What we will argue to the 
jury is that there was no deliberate attempt to defraud anyone 
and that Tthel misunderstandings occurred as a result of conduct 
of the attorneys." (Emphasis added.) Additionally, during 
closing arguments, defendant's counsel argued that defendant 
"d[id] not obtain or exercise control over the money. No checks 
were ever written to Thomas Vigil. He is neither the object nor 
tKe reason for the money being given." Whether defendant was 
claiming that he had an "honest claim of right" to the money 
contradicts defendant's trial counsel's argument that he had no 
control over the money and may or may not be inconsistent with 
attorney misconduct. Thus, because defendant's defense at trial 
was not apparently based on the statutory defenses, we conclude 
no error existed which would have been plain to the trial court. 
Cf. State v. Bishop, 753 ?.2d 439, 489 "[Utah 1988; (where 
instruction was inconsistent with defendant's theory of case, no 
error in refusing instruction); State v. Pendergrass, 803 P. 2d 
1261, 1264-65 (Utah App. 1990) (no error when trial court refused 
to submit requested instruction which was inconsistent with 
defendant's theory of defense). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold that the trial court correctly concluded theft by 
deception can occur in an adoption setting and, therefore, it 
properly instructed the jury en this issue. Because defendant 
failed to adequately brief his argument regarding the propriety 
of the trial court's refusal to ask potential jurors two 
questions submitted by defendant, we decline to address it en -**• 
appeal. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to further question two jurors who had been exposed 
to media concerning failed adoptions, nor did it abuse its 
discretion in excluding Roland Oliver's testimony. We do not 
address defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing 
16. Defendant does not argue the attorneys wrongly informed him 
that he had "an honest claim of right to" the money, but that 
they instead performed inadequate services which forced him to 
look for a new attorney and, he reasons, new prospective adoptive 
parents. 
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to submit two of his proposed instructions to the jury because 
defendant failed to adequately brief the issue on appeal. 
Lastly, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails 
because defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced by the 
omission of the defense instructions. Because trial counsel was 
advancing a different theory of defense at trial, the trial court 
did not commit plain error by not submitting the statutory 
defense instructions sua sponte. Defendant's convictions are 
affirr 
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